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Chapter pages in book: (p. 5 - 40)ACLAUSE in the National Bureau's by-laws provides that the
Executive Committee, "under the general direction of the Board,
shall select such subjects for investigation as may be most
pertinent to the economic, social, and industrial needs of the
times."
This rule makes it incumbent upon us at intervals to take
stock of what we have done and to consider whether, in using
the resources with which we have been entrusted, we are paying
proper attention to changing needs. The more rapidly and the
more drastically the times change, the more frequent and search-
ing should these self-examinations be. This war, like World
War I, has intensified the demand for economic knowledge; the
peace we expect will bring a new shift in needs, just as the 1914-
i8 War did, not merely a return to the prewar status.
In January the National Bureau completed its twenty-fourth
year. A review of its program should start with the economics
on which our founders were brought up and which they ap-
plied to the problems of their day. Their decision to organize
for economic research, the kind of organizaiion they formed,
and the type of inquiries they started grew out of the deficiencies
they had found in their economic equipment for aiding in the
mobilization of resources for war.
AND THE NEEDS OF PEACE
In contrast to mercantilism, 'the policy of power', classical eco-
nomics was an analysis of the ordinary business of life in com-
munities at peace. It took for granted that the end of endeavor
was to meet the wants of consumers. These wants were supplied
by a huge and intricate system of voluntary cooperation among
men, each of whom decided for himself how he should try to
make a money income and what to do with it. The system in-
volved a vast deal of planning day by day; but this planning
was done in each household and business enterprise, by people
who were supposed to know what they wanted and to look out
for their own interests.
5Economists thought of this system as an unplanned historical
growth. Their central problem was how millions of people
manage to promote their common welfare without an over-all
plan, though everyone aims at his private advantage, not at
public welfare. Economists found the solution in the role played
by prices. The prices individuals are ready to pay for consumers'
goods coalesce into market demand schedules. These schedules
are bids for goods, which anyone who likes can accept if he is
able to produce on the market's terms, which means to sellas
cheaply as his competitors. Business enterprisers buy the services
of laborers, land, and capital: in turn their disbursements of
wages, rent, and interest, together with their profits, constitute
the incomes that enable consumrs to buy. When competition is
free, the management of production gets into the hands of the
most efficient enterprisers; maladjustments of supply to demand
are corrected more or less promptly; in equilibrium every worker,
property owner, and enterpriser receives an income represent-
ing society's money valuation of his marginal contribution to
the total product; by spending his income as he likes,everyone
helps to direct production toward the goods people want;re-
sponsibility for getting his own living spurs everyone to efficiency
as a moneymaker. In this scheme of thought, an over-all plan
drawn up and imposed by government is not merely superfluous,
but positively harmful because individuals know more than any
official can about what they want, and satisfying consumers'
wants is the ultimate economic aim.
Individual planning was accepted as the controlling factor in
the whole system of economic activities. The theory offered was
less an account of how people behave than an analysis of how
it is to their economic interest to behave. The earlier classicists
were realistic about what they considered the shortsighted con-
duct of the working classes in marrying too early and begetting
too many children; but the 'pure theory' of later generations
paid little attention to this alleged lapse from rationality, and
represented conduct as a struggle between desires to consume
and disinclinations to labor or to wait. These desires and dis-
inclinations were treated as the real forces controlling economic
behavior. Economists had little information about actual de-
mand and supply schedules, which they thought they could do
without. To demonstrate the 'principles' of economics, a theorist
used imaginary schedules to which he could give avariety of
forms, each of which posed an interestingproblem that could be
solved by showing what self-interest would leadpeople to do
under the assumed conditions.
Such economic theorizing was confined mainly to'qualitative
analysis'. Individuals, to be sure, had to havequantitative data
about wages, prices, costs, and the like; but onlydata that bore
on their private concerns. Intothese infinite and ever changing
details a theorist did not enter. He wished to generalizeabout
economic behavior at large, and did so basically in termsof the
'real forces' that controlled it. Since individuals did notaim at
maximizing the national income, they could get onwell enough
without knowing how large it was. So also could the economist
who explained the principles on which individuals acted.Thus,
for example, he sought to show the 'laws' or principlesaccord-
ing to which the national income isdistributed among wage
earners, landlords, capitalists,and entrepreneurs, without in-
quiring how much there is to divide at any time andplace, or
what percentage goes to each of the four groups, or how many
people there are in each group, or how much income anyone
gets. Similarly, the theorist expoundedthe principles according
to which everyone distributes hisexpenditures among many
kinds of goods, without inquiring what percentage he spends on
food, clothing, shelter, and the amenities of life; how these
percentages vary with income, or howmuch of food, clothing,
shelter, and the amenities anyone is able to obtain.
Much more quantitative work on economic problems was done
before the first World War than is often remembered, butlittle
was incorporated into economictheory. Economists dealing with
poor relief, labor conditions,agriculture, foreign trade, banking,
and so on accumulated factual information in impressivedetail
about their chosen themes, and many were ardent advocatesof
institutional reforms. But the relation of these special studies
and proposals to the central body of principles was (andstill is)
loose. Le Play's group, the German historical school,and their
allies in other countries were realistically inclined; buttheir
writings did not give such clear insight intothe principles of
free enterprise as did orthodox theory—and that was the matter
of keenest economic interest in the democratic nations.
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1 7ECONOMICS AND THE NEEDS OF WAR
In peacetime the economist was typicallyan onlooker, not a
planner or operator of the activities he tried to explain. Onlya
few of the largest business enterprises employed economists, and
government was supposed to intervene in economic activities
only to keep the system of private enterprise running smoothly.
Economists might regard themselvesas good advisers when
things went wrong; but that ratingwas not widely endorsed by
the public, because economists differedso seriously about what
ought to be done in a practical way. Theywere found on both
sides of most questions of the day—themonetary standard,
banking organization, railway supervision, controlover trusts,
taxation, social legislation, trade unions, and whatnot. For the
most part, professional economists made their livings by teach-
ing. There was not much demand for them in other lines. Theirs
was an academic profession in peacetime.
World War I called these student bystanders into actionon an
unprecedented scale because it required the mobilization of all
resources under governmental direction. The government drafted
men into the armed services, it decided what supplies and equip-
ment should be produced, it apportioned raw materials and
consumer goods, itfixed many prices and wages, it decided
what fractions of their incomes individuals and businessenter-
prises must contribute as taxes, it supervised the investment of
capital and (livertc(I all the savings it could intowar bonds. In
uuI,aW;IrCCI Hsi iniyisan cconomyinwhich individual
f)LtIIIIiIIgissuppkmcntcd by ovcr-all planning, with the proviso
that where the two sets of plans conflict, the central plan shall
prevail. Over-all planning calls for a huge staff of experts pos-
sessed of the most diverse skills—military, naval, and aeroriauti-
cal officers, engineers and designers of all sorts, business organ-
izers, dieticians and public health specialists, lawyers, account-
ants, public relations counselors, physicians, surgeons, dentists,
statisticians, economists, and many others.
Economists are wanted, less because they possess detailed
knowledge about many of the thousand and one jobs to be
performed than because they are trained to think of the econ-
omy as a whole—of 'the one in the many and the many in the
one', to use Marshall's favorite phrase. The adjustment of each
activity to the grand complex of all activities that economists
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picture in peacetime as effected through the mechanism of prices
must be maintained in wartime largely by administrative de-
cisions. The more thorough the mobilization of resources, the
more difficult and the more imperative becomes this task.The
military staff planning to raise a huge army must balance their
requirements against the demands of the industries that support
both the armed forces and the civilian population. The agen-
cies reguLating wages must watch the cost of living, which de-
pends on the prices of staples. Those administering prices must
foresee relations to costs of production, consumer requirements
and purchasing power, availability of raw materials, possibili-
ties of substituting one good for another, and so on almost
without end. The tax authorities must consider individual in-
comes of different types, business profits, and the part taxes
play in checking price inflation. Such interrelations ramify over
the whole field. Every government planner eager to fulfill his
own responsibilities runs the risk of hampering the plans of
his colleagues, and the equal risk that the demands of these col-
leagues will hamper his own job. Hence every agency requires
counsellors familiar with the interrelations among economic
factors. Never is the demand for the services of economists so
great as in war. And this demand arises from pressing needs
of the times as they impinge upon practical men carrying heavy
responsibilities, not from a disposition to magnify the importance
of economics.
But the economic most wanted III tIilfl%
outto be of a somewhat different sortthan that chiefly culti-
vated in peace. Economists who helped in themobilization oi
World War I found that they needed knowledgeabout thewhok
economy ofthe sort a business executive possesses abouthis in-
dustry—information on quantities as well as qualities,knowi-
edge tested for conformity to fact and adaptable tochanging con-
dit ions.
Definite quantitative information wascalledfor about the
supplies and the uses of many commodities,the number of men
qualified to do work of diverse kinds, the amountof the national
income and its distribution—not only by typeof income but also
by industrial source, geographical area,kind of goods turned
out, and size of incomereceived. Many of the economists inthe
numerous war agenciesof 1917-18spentmost of their time col-
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9lecting what information they could about such matters, and
making hazardous estimates of quantities that were unknown.
The plague of questionnaires which aroused so many complaints
was a belated effort to get some of the quantitative data wanted as
a basis for planning. Far too often officials had to proceed on the
basis of guesswork.
EFFECT OF WORLD WAR I ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMICS
It is not surprising that the first World War gave a marked im-
petus to search for the economic knowledge that had been lack-
ing. Nowhere was this impetus more effective than in the United
States. Many of the efforts to gather statistics, hastily organized
to meet war exigencies, were continued and expanded by perma-
ment agencies during the following years of peace. The greater
abundance of data stimulated efforts to discover what they really
meant. The methods of statistical inference improved rapidly at
the hands of men with mathematical training. Studies based upon
statistical observations ordered in time are confronted by the
problems of change, and must use some form of time-series analy-
sis. The investigations begun before the war into secular, cyclical,
seasonal, and random changes in economic activities were pushed
forward vigorously—in some directions recklessly, as the mis-
adventures of 'business forecasting' bear witness. And this type
of economic inquiry is realistic. For the process of setting up
imaginary conditions and reasoning about how men would act
if they knew and pursued their economic interests, it substitutes
mass observations of economic activities. Even speculative theor-
izing often took on a more realistic coloring. The theory of prices,
which had been confined mainly to conditions of free competi-
tion, was extended to cover a variety of quasi-monopolistic con-
ditions. Efforts were made to integrate the theory of money and
of business cycles with the general body of economic principles.
Of course, this attempt to develop economics as an objective
science of human behavior through the use of mass observations
labored under a material handicap. Speculating about what it is
to the interest of men to do under imagined conditions can be
carried on by a lonely thinker in his closet. He requires no staff
of assistants, and no financial aid beyond a living salary. In con-
trast, the investigator who tries to utilize observations isiii the
position of an experimental scientist. He must have a laboratory,
specialized equipment, and assistants. Lonely thinkers can and
do make contributions in this field; but they mustconfine them-
selves to problems that require relatively few andeasily accessible
data. Larger undertakings call for teamwork.And the largest
undertakings are often the most significant; for example,studies
of national income and business cycles.
It was therefore natural that the impetus given byWorld War
I to realistic inquiry into economics should lead tothe founding
of institutes for economic research, each with its staffof investi-
gators and assistants. The National Bureau was oneof several.
It was organized the year after the war closed andincorporated
in January 1920 by a group of economists, most of whombad
shared in the wartime mobilization and learned from hard ex-
perience how inadequate was their equipment for dealing withthe
problems put up to them. They wanted to increase knowledge of
the sort the war had demanded, for they believed that it would
be valuable also in peace. Thus the National Bureau was, in the
language of the day, a World War I baby, posthumously born.
THE NATIONAL BUREAU BETWEEN Two WARS
The first topic selected by the National Bureau as pertinent to
the needs of postwar times was national income. The selection
was fortunate in that national incomeprovided a framework into
which all our subsequent investigations could be fitted.
While our first reports on national income in 1909-19 marked
a considerable advance beyond earlierinvestigations, several large
items were based upon very inadequate data, the concepts and
methods were not fully thought out, and the estimates covered
a period so brief and so exceptionalthat they did not serve cer-
tain important purposes. Hence we had good reason for continu-
ing and trying to improve upon the first venture. In 1922 and
1925 Oswald W. Knauth and Maurice Levenallocated the na-
tional totals to states; in 1930 W. I. King revised and extended
his earlier estimates; in 1937 Simon Kuznets dealt with capital
formation and the next year Solomon Fabricant completed his
study of capital consumption. In connection with this work
Kuznets analyzed the flow of commodities to consumers; Harold
Barger provided quarterly estimates of outgo and income in
1921-38; Milton Friedman and Kuznets broke new ground in
their study of Incomes from Independent Professional Practice.
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10 IIBy organizing the Conference on Research in Income and
Wealth we enlisted the cooperation of the most active specialists
connected with other agencies to analyze income concepts, stimu-
late the collection of fuller data, and criticize methods and results.
The six volumes published so far in our Studies in Income
and Wealth contain technical papers of value to all students in
the field. Our program was capped in 1941bythe publication of
Kuznets' two volumes on National incomc and its Composition.
Meanwhile, much to our satisfaction, the federal government
had taken over the laborious task of making annual and later
quarterly estimates of national income, supplemented by monthly
estimates of payments to individuals, borrowing our experts to
get their work started.
We now have a continuous series of estimates covering twenty
years, with partial extensions back to the i88o's, with breakdowns
by industrial source, type of income, and type of final product,
supplemented by estimates of individual and business savings or
dissavings, and of the formation and consumption of capital. But
we do not think of work on national income as completed. Esti-
mates of the distribution of income by size, of great social impor-
tance, are still in a most unsatisfactory condition. International
comparisons are clouded by differences in concepts. Close as our
connections with the income unit of the Department of Com-
merce have been, we think some well-staffed independent agency
should follow the official procedures critically, as Kuznets is
doing in two papers on national product in wartime in which
he deals with the inflationary elements in the totals for recent
years and discusses the difficulties encountered when one applies
peacetime concepts to national product during wars. Just what
share the National Bureau should take in further explorations is
a question we must face in the near future.
Our studies of production and productivity have an obvious
connection with national income classified by industrial origin.
Here belong Arthur F. Burns' Production Trends in the United
States since 1870, and Harry Jerome's penetrating analysis of
Mechanization in industry, both published in 1934;CharlesA.
Bliss' cross-section view of The Structure of Manufacturing Pro-
duction (1939); Fabricant's The Output of Manufacturing in-
dust net (1940) and Employment in Manufacturing, 1899-1939,
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An Analysis of itsRelation to the Volume ofProduction (1942);
Barger and Landsbcrg'sAmerican Agriculture—AStudy of Out-
put, Employmentand Productivity (194;) ;and Barger and
Schurr's companion piece onThe Mining industries.Consider-
able progress has beenmade upon monographsdealing with pro-
duction and productivityin transportationand other public util-
ities. We hope that thisseries of studies, madepossible by grants
from the Maurice andLaura Falk Foundation, canhe rounded
out by a report onthe major serviceindustries, and the broad
conclusions from the whole surveysummarized in a report for
which we have tentative plans.
The breakdown ofnational income estimatesby type has been
lollowed by studies of wages, rent,interest, and profits.
In 1923 King wroteEmployment, Hours, andEarnings, 1920-22.
Leo Wolman surveyedchanges in trade unionmembership in
1924 and 1936,and is bringing his figures up todate in an Occa-
sional Paper. He contributedchapters on Consumptionand the
Standard of Living and onLabor to Recent EconomicChanges
(1929). But most ofWolman's energy has beendevoted to a his-
tory of wages inthe United States thatpromises to be one of our
major contributions.Another aspect of labor supplyand income
is treated in our threevolumes on migration:Jerome's Migration
and Business Cycles (1926);ImreFerenczi's collection of inter-
national statistics of migration(1929), and the companionvol-
ume ofinterpretations edited by WalterF. Willcox (1931).
Rentsof houses and apartments weretreated in David L.
Wickens' Residential Real Estate(1941); interest rates in Fred-
erick R. Macaulay's highlyoriginal volume: SomeTheoretical
Problems suggested by Movementsof Interest Rates, BondYields,
and Stock Prices (1938).The comprehensive CorporateBond
Project, carried out with thehelp of severalgovernmental and
private agencies, hasprovided a wealth of data neverbefore
available to investigators, andshould yield highlysignificant
results when they are fullyanalyzed. David Durand'sTechnical
Paper on Basic Yieldsof Corporate Bonds, 1900-1942(June 1942)
is the first fruit of thisundertaking. W. BraddockHickman has
in preparation anexploratory analysis of the patternof interest
rates by term tomaturity, and also a paper onthe eflects of the
wartime 'freezing' of the interestrate pattern. Whilehis with-
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Our studies of production and productivity have an obvious
connection with national income classified by industrial origin.
Here belong Arthur F. Burns' Production Trends in the United
States since 1870, and Harry Jerome's penetrating analysis of
Mechanization in industry, both published in 1934;CharlesA.
Bliss' cross-section view of The Structure of Manufacturing Pro-
duction (1939); Fabricant's The Output of Manufacturing in-
dust net (1940) and Employment in Manufacturing, 1899-1939,
12 -
An Analysis of itsRelation to the Volume ofProduction (1942);
Barger and Landsbcrg'sAmerican Agriculture—AStudy of Out-
put, Employmentand Productivity (194;) ;and Barger and
Schurr's companion piece onThe Mining industries.Consider-
able progress has beenmade upon monographsdealing with pro-
duction and productivityin transportationand other public util-
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Project, carried out with thehelp of severalgovernmental and
private agencies, hasprovided a wealth of data neverbefore
available to investigators, andshould yield highlysignificant
results when they are fullyanalyzed. David Durand'sTechnical
Paper on Basic Yieldsof Corporate Bonds, 1900-1942(June 1942)
is the first fruit of thisundertaking. W. BraddockHickman has
in preparation anexploratory analysis of the patternof interest
rates by term tomaturity, and also a paper onthe eflects of the
wartime 'freezing' of the interestrate pattern. Whilehis with-
'3drawal to enter the armed forcesIas delayed the completion of
these studies, we hope that he willreturn to us after the war.
Of profits we have made two investigations:Ralph C. Epstein's
Industrial Profits in the United State, and W. A. Paton's
Corporate Profits as shown by AuditReports (1935). Morere-
cently, the Program of Research inFinance has collected the
largest known samples of the balance sheetsand income accounts
of business enterprises, big and little. Theirexploitation has been
retarded by the war, butwe plan to resume our analysis as soon
as possible.
National income estimators deal withprices as much as with
physical output. Their totalsare sums of products obtained in
theory, and largely in practice, bymultiplying units of output by
unit Thus our original venture incitedus to explore the
system of prices.
Our cultivation of this field began withthe studies of Frederick
C; Mills that led up to his Behaviorof Prices (1927)andPrices
in Recession and Recovery (1936).Duringthe last three years,
Mills has been concentratingon the cyclical behavior of prices.
Under his leadershipwas organized the Conference on Price Re-
search, which has brought together thecountry's leading special-
ists and done much to stimulate inquiryinto price problems.
Among the direct results of the Conferencehave been detailed
reports on prices in the bituminous coal, textile, steel,and petro-
leum industries; also Joel Dean'sexperimental paper, The Rela-
tion of Cost to Output fora Leather Belt Shop (1941),andCost
Behavior and Price Policy by the Committeeon Price Determina-
tion
Thefunctioning of the wholeeconomic system, and therefore
national income, depends alsoon financial relationships and pro-
cesses.
Our Program of Research in Finance,which developed out
of the Exploratory Committeeon Financial Research appointed
in 1936, began by investigatingconsumer instalment financing,
the various agencies that havegrown up in this rapidly expand-
ing business, the amount of creditextended by them, the risks
they encounter, their operatingexperience, and the relations of
instalment credit to business cycles.The ten brief monographs
published since 1940providea systematic surveyof the field
and proved useful to war agencies when adrastic restricting
of instalment credit seemed necessary. Again wehad the satis-
faction of finding that the Department of C.jnmerceand the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systemwould add
to their current reporting servicedata of the kind we had helped
in assembling.
Turning from consumer to business financing, theProgram
has inquired into recent innovations. Neil H.Jacoby and Ray-
mond J. Saulnier collaborated on Term Leading toBusiness,
Accounts Receivable Financing, Financing Inventory onField-
Warehouse Receipts, and Instalment Financing of incomc-Pro-
ducing Equipment. Charles L. Merwin studiedthe financing of
small and A. R. Koch of large corporations duringthe interwar
period, and Pearson Hunt and Koch the financial requirements
of department stores. A study of the pattern ofbusiness financial
structure, by Walter A.Chudson, is in press, and another by
Sidney S. Alexander, dealing with changes inthe financial
structure of business since the turnof the century, is in prep-
aration. Jacoby and Saulnier are now weavingthe various strands
of the whole investigation into a report showinghow the emerg-
ing problems of banking are related tolonger-term tendencies
in the financing of enterprise.
No one unfamiliar with the varieties of financial practiceand
accounting methods can realize the difficultiesthat have been
surmounted in collecting and analyzing the dataunderlying
these reports, or how much the investigatorshave been aided by
the Committee on Research in Finance,which brings a wide
of experience to the planning of the undertakingsand
the critical reviewing of first drafts.
That public as well as private finance influencesthe national
income everyone realizes in these years of enormous govern-
mental expenditures, heavy taxation, and hugepublic debts.
The Conference on Research in Fiscal Policy,organized in
1937underthe chairmanship of W. Leonard Crum, chose as
its task "a comprehensive investigation of theeconomic effects
of fiscal policy—broadly defined to include taxation,debt, and
expenditures of federal, state, and local governments—upon pro-
duction, savings, consumption, national incomeand wealth, and
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That public as well as private finance influencesthe national
income everyone realizes in these years of enormous govern-
mental expenditures, heavy taxation, and hugepublic debts.
The Conference on Research in Fiscal Policy,organized in
1937underthe chairmanship of W. Leonard Crum, chose as
its task "a comprehensive investigation of theeconomic effects
of fiscal policy—broadly defined to include taxation,debt, and
expenditures of federal, state, and local governments—upon pro-
duction, savings, consumption, national incomeand wealth, and
14 '5related matters". Its projected report on the Relation of Taxable
Income and Income as Defined for Business Purposes has been
delayed by loss of personnel not replaceable underwar condi-
tions. Meanwhile, the chairman, in collaboration with John F.
Fennelly and Lawrence H. Seltzer, wrote Fiscal Planning for
Total War (Sept. 1942), which was welcomed bysome of the
authorities responsible for shaping fiscal policy. We have hopes
that Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses in Taxation by
Lawrence H. Seltzer, M. Slade Kencirick, and Scima Goldsmith
can be completed this year. Crum is now putting all his time
not commandeered by imperative duties into a critical survey
of the fiscal problems of reconstruction andpeace.
The secular growth of national income, together with its alter-
nating expansions and contractions, suggest investigation of the
leading types of change to which economic activitiesare subject.
One of our earliest reports, Business cycles and Unem ploy-
inent (1923), was prepared for a subcommittee of President
Harding's Conference on Unemployment. Laterwe made sev-
eral studies of relief measures, of which themost notable were
King's Trends in Philanthropy (1928) and two reportson public
works as a means of stemming cyclical contractions,one by
Wolman in 1930, the other by Arthur Ii Gayer in1935.
Our systematic research in business cycles started in the 1920's.
Its earliest fruits were Business Annals by Willard L. Thorp
(1926), and Business Gycles: The Problem and Its Setting by
Wesley C. Mitchell (1927). The latter outlined aprogram of col-
lecting time series rcpresenting many economic activities insev-
eral countries, and of analyzing their cyclical behavioron a
uniform plan. That large undertaking is still inprocess. Some
of the findings it yielded were utilized by John Maurice Clark
in Strategic Factors in Business Cycles (1934), and in ha Ifa
dozen brief reports published in our Bulletins and Occasional
Papers. A manuscript by Burns and Mitchell describing and
evaluating our methods of measuring cyclical behavior will be
sent to press early in 1944.
Meanwhile we have been experimenting withways of putting
together our measures of different activities tosee what picture
they give of business cycles; but so much rcnlainsto be done
that even a preliminary sketch of the finaloutcome of this long
investigation can hardly be issued for a couple of years.Before
then we hope that some of our projectedmonographs on the
cyclicalbehavior of various factorsin businesswillappear.
Gottfried Haberler's Consumer Instalment Credit andEconomic
Fluctuations, prepared for the Program ofResearch in Finance,
provides valuable information on one of these factors.Moses
Abramovitz's manuscript on manufacturers' inventories is in an
advanced stage; chapters of Thor Hukgren's volume onrail-
roading have been published as Occasional Papers ijand
Mills has made progress on prices, Bums on constrUCtion,Wol-
man on wages, Ruth P.Mack on the production and distribu-
tion of consumer goods, and Oskar Morgenstern oninterna-
tional financial relations. Several other monographs havebeen
interrupted by the war.
While the business cycle program has hccn following itsde-
liberate course, we have given some attention to other typesof
economic change. In 1933 Kuznets compictedSeasonal Varia-
lions in industry and Trade; in 1934 Burnsfollowed with Pro-
duction Trends in the United States since 1870. Secularshifts are
brought out in our studies of production and productivity, as
well as in the backward extension of our national incomeesti-
mates. The current studiesby Alexander, Jacoby, and Saulnier
for the Program of Research in Finance are adding to ourknowl-
edge of structural changes in business financing.
One of the major tasks of research, as theNational Bureau
staff sees the field, is to coordinate what is knownabout secular
trends, 'long cycles', structural changes, business cycles,random
perturbations, and perhaps even seasonal variations, in ananalyti-
cal study of the growth of the American economy. Butthat is
an ambitious undertakingfor which we are not yet ready to
draw specifications.
Finally, the National Bureau has made two comprehensive sur-
veys of the country's economicorganization and the relations
among its parts. The first was RecentEconomic Changes, written
by numerous collaborators for a committeeappointed by Herhert
Hoover when Secretary of Commerce. The second wasthe more
closely knitsurveyby Mills, Economic 7'eru/encies in the U,zited
States(1932).
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iG 17Thus all the National Bureau's researches have been relatedto
its initial undertaking. They have been studies of nationalin-
come classified on different bases, or of single types of income,
or of production and prices, or of the financial processes involved
in producing and distributing income,or of fiscal factors affect-
ing income, or of changes to which national income and itscom-
ponents are subject, or general surveys of the economy which
produces and consumes income.
Some scheme of integrating researches is requisiteto orderly
thinking and the growth of knowledge. Numerous schemesare
made possible by the manifold interrelations that tie all economic
activities to one another. A series of researches that started with
production, or employment, or prices,or the financial organiza-
tion, or fiscal problems, or secular growth,or business cycles, or
any other major branch or aspect of economic activity, would,
if pressed vigorously, lead to all other branches andaspects. But
it is doubtful that any other plan of organization would have
provided so simple and cleara framework for our program as the
one we have used.
A framework that shows the relations of different researches
to national income reveals also the relation of one investigation
to others. To give a few examples of the ways in which our
inquiries tie into one another: Kuznets uses the chronology de-
veloped by the business cycle unit in analyzingyear to year
fluctuations in national income; in turn, his estimates of this
income and its components are grist forour business cycle mill.
Fabricant's studies of capital consumption feed directly into
Kuznets' hopper. Their joint product leadsto and is illumi-
nated by studies of productivity. The latter aid ininterpreting
Wolman's findings concerning wage rates, employment, and
earnings. Crum, Seltzer, and Fennelly organized their Fiscal
Planning for Total War around an analysis of the national in-
come and its components. Our 'bond project' provides materials
of high value for the study ofone type of income, of secular
and cyclical movements, and of certain changes in financial
practice. Mills' work on prices and Wolman'son wage rates
make them invaluable members of the business cycle unit.All
our inquiries stand to profit by what the Program of Financial
Research learns from its collection of business balance sheets
and income accounts, while the interpretation of these results
will be facilitated by using what we have learned from other
sources about output, productivity, prices ofcommodities and
securities, interest rates, consumer purchasing power, and busi-
ness conditions.
Thus, results of the kind we have been getting facilitate the
process of learning more. Cumulative growth has longbeen rec-
ognized as a characteristic of empirical science. Working in the
economic field, we have had our taste of an old and gratifying
experience. A continuation by numerous agencies of such re-
searches will lay an ever firmer foundation of tested knowledge
concerning our economic organization and its operations that
should enable the nation to conduct its affairs more successfully
in the future. It should help also to further a type of economic
theory that can be combined with or contrasted to the tradi-
tional analysis of what it is to a man's interest to do, and that
will deal more directly with actual behavior.
It would not be prudent to expect rapid realization of these
high hopes. Empirical researchislike experimentation—the
process is costly and the results uncertain. It requires as much
exact thinking as does speculation, and the handLing of vastly
more observations. Its progress depends on the increase and irn-
provement of statistical data—a social process that investigators
can influence but not control.
These obstacles put a high premium upon skillful long range
planning of new ventures by numerous research groups cooperat-
ing with one another. Each planning group should be large
enough to include men with diverse interests and skills.Its
membership should change with the times, but not so rapidly
as to disrupt continuity of thinking. Momentum is lost when
each new project is treated as an independent item and put in
the hands of a staff organized to perform this one task, and dis-
banded after its report is written. If the National Bureau can
claim that its many investigations have promoted one another
and promise to cumulate still more effectively in the future, it
must thank those supporters who have believed that the needs
of the times for economic research can best be met by systematic
and persistent study of fundamental processes.
OF WORLD WAR II ON THE NATIONAL BuREAu
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and promise to cumulate still more effectively in the future, it
must thank those supporters who have believed that the needs
of the times for economic research can best be met by systematic
and persistent study of fundamental processes.
OF WORLD WAR II ON THE NATIONAL BuREAu
The most obvious effect of the second World War on the
'9 i8National Bureau has been the loss of personnel. Thirteen ofour
investigators and one of our Directors have been inducted into
the armed forces; thirty-five staff members and collaborators,
and at least four Directors have entered the civilian servicesof
the government. Some of the vacancieswe have been able to
fill by engaging men from universities where the studenten-
rollment has declined sharply, women, and refugee scholarsnot
eligible for military service or public employment. Butsome of the
specialists among our collaborators and staff couldnot be re-
placed, and the projects on which theywere engaged have had
to be postponed for the duration. The most notable of these
suspensions have already been mentioned.
in addition, the National Bureau has been askedto perform
three considerable tasks for the public benefit. Geoffrey H. Moore
has devoted much of his time during thepast year to a careful
study for the War Production Board of the war's effectupon
physical output. For the sameagency, Albert Wohlsteuer has
investigated the effect of World War Iupon the labor force
and output in Germany and Great Britain. As chairman ofa
committee appointed by the President of the American Statisti-
cal Association, Mills spent two months in examining thecost
of living index compiled by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics, on which those responsible for the national policy of
wage control rely so heavily.
On our own initiative, we have publishedsome of our Occa-
sional Papers in a series called Our Economy in War. Lastyear's
annual report by the Director of Research, Wartime 'Prosperity'
and the Future, was issued iii this series. Other titlesare Prices
in a War Economy by F. C. Mills; The Effect of Waron Busi-
ness Financing by C. A. Schmidt and R. A. Young; twopapers
by Charles R. Whittlesey, The Effect of the Waron Currency
and Deposits and The Banking System and WarFinance;
British and American Plans for International Currency Stabiliza-
tion by J. H. Riddle; Railway Traffic Expansion and Useof
Resources in World War II by Thor Hukgren; National Pro-
duct, War and Prewar, by Simon Kuznets; Production ofIn-
dustrial Materials in World Wars I and II by G. H. Moore;
The Labor Forcein Wartime America by C. D. Long;
Canada's Financial System in War by B. H. Higgins; and Nazi
War Finance and Banking by Otto Nathan. Additionalpapers
in this series, now in press or in an advanced stage of prepara-
tion, are Corporate Cash Balances in Peace and War, 1914-1943
byFriedrich Lutz; Union Membership in Wartime by Leo
Wolman; War Financing and the Pattern of Interest Rates by
W. Braddock Hickman; Price Control, 1942-1943byGeorge
Katona; War Financing and the Federal Reserve System by
Anna Youngman; War Financing Methods and Postwar In-
flation in Continental Countries by Michael Heilperin; Effect
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All these war studies are natural outgrowths of research we
were doing or planning before Pearl Harbor was attacked. That
our peacetime program proved pertinent to the needs of war-
time is due to our founders who sought knowledge of the type
they had wanted when sharing in the mobilization for World
War I. This is knowledge of quantities as well as qualities.
Based as it is primarily upon mass observations of actual pro-
cesses, it has a definite relation to the 'real world'. Our findings
concern conditions that are continuously changing because our
basic data represent a 'dynamic', not a 'static' economy. In short,
it is economic knowledge of the sort that can be put to practical
use whether in peace or in war by men who have to cope with
actual problems.
Hence, while the war has impeded our progress by drawing
off many of our most valuable investigators and has led us to
point up many of our findings to special exigencies, it has not
called for sweeping alterations in our methods or in our pro-
gram. We have continued our peacetime projects, not from re-
luctance to change our ways, but because in wartime the coun-
try more than ever needs knowledge of the kind have been
striving to gain. To us the lesson of war is that in years to come
we should hold to the course set by our founders, pressing vig-
orously the basic investigations now in process, and, when social
conditions require and our means allow, entering new fields.
POSTWAR PLANNING
The National Bureau's share in postwar planning is to foresee
as best it can what objects of economic research will be most
pertinent to the needs of times to come and which it is fitted to
meet. Obviously, economic conditions in the postwar world will
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20 - 2Ldepend in large part upon the terms of settlement. Sincewe do
not yet know these terms, we must base our postwar planning on
what now seems probable. Fortunately, we can accept prevail-
ing opinion on the basic issues. We take it for granted that the
United Nations will win a complete victory over first Germany,
then Japan. We assume that the United Nations will setup an
organization of some type, in which the United States will
join, for perpetuating the peace they have won. Finally, we as-
sume that the American people will desire to resume their tra-
ditional form of economic organization as promptly as condi-
tions make possible.
Given these assumptions, how should we use the resources en-
trusted to us? That is a question for the Board of Directors, and
more particularly its Executive Committee, to answer. But it is
the duty of the Director of Research to submit for consideration
the views of the staff.
The transition from war to peace will be a time of sharp dislo-
cations and hurried reorganization. Great as will be the rejoic-
ing over victory and high as will be the hope of building a better
world, millions of Americans will face grave uncertainties. So
also in still greater degree will the peoples of other countries,
whatever their present relation to the war. Returning men in the
armed forces to jobs at home, winding up war contracts, re-
organizing and retooling industry for civilian production, man-
aging the public debt, arranging the resumption of international
trade, and developing a practicable international currency are a
few of the great and difficult tasks that must somehow be per-
formed. Government expenditures will continue to run on some-
thing like the war level for months after military operations have
ceased; interest charges on a public debt of more than $2oo
billion and our share in keeping the peace will hold them high
for many years. How early a reduction of federal taxes will
prove feasible we do not know.
Confidence that the many difficulties of returning to peace will
be surmounted is enhanced by the care, not to say anxiety, with
which postwar plans are now being laid by many agencies,
private as well as public. The preparations by business and gov-
ernment to provide goods and jobs on a large scale as rapidly as
possible should do much to facilitate the transition. A second
favorable factor is the prospect that demobilization will be car-
ried out in two steps—a start when Germany surrenders, a
finish when Japan gives up. Third, an active demand for goods
will be in prospect at home and abroad. In this country the de-
mand will be especially keen for durables and semi-durables;
foreign consumers will need also perishables in vast quantities,
and the appetite of our own people will have been whetted for
types of perishables that are now rationed or unobtainable. Both
domestic and foreign demands promise to be greater than after
World War I because this war and our participation in it have
already lasted longer, because it has wrought greater destruc-
tion of property, and because mobilization has been more com-
plete. At its end the peoples of Europe, China, and Japan will
be even more impoverished than they were in 1919.Soviet
Russia may be the only belligerent or occupied country in
Europe or Asia to emerge in less desperate straits than in 1918-19,
when it was torn by civil strife; but at best its needs for goods
will be stupendous. A final promising factor is that American
consumers will have on hand a wholly unprecedented volume
of purchasing power—small hoards of currency that will make
a vast aggregate, large deposits in commercial and savings banks,
and billions in war bonds. Graver uncertainties exist concern-
ing the purchasing power of foreign nations; but presumably
some plan will be devised for financing their most pressing
needs. All in all, there seems good reason to expect that busi-
ness as usual can be resumed, at least in the United States,
within a relatively short period, without grave hardship to many
people, though not without much shifting about and temporary
unemployment.
Perhaps the gravest danger is that the first postwar year may
bring a great inflation of prices such as occurred in 1919.Then
domestic and export demands for consumer goods became in-
tense before industry could be reorganized for efficient produc-
tion. Though war plants were closing and many demobilized
service men were hunting jobs, savings and huge governmental
disbursements combined with current earnings to provide abun-
dant purchasing power. Retailers had difficulty in getting suf-
ficient goods to satisfy eager customers, and marked up prices
time after time. Wholesalers, jobbers, and manufacturers raised
their prices in turn; even so they could not fill the flood of
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23orders pouring into their offices. Frequently they could ship
only a half or a third of the articles a retailer wanted. Disap-
pointed retailers then began doubling or tripling the quantities
they asked for. This pyramiding of orders produced an illusion
of demands at unheard of prices for quantities of goods exceed-
ing the country's ability to produce. The intensity of this boom
brought it to an early end. What was called a 'buyers' strike'
developed; the physical volume of goods sold declined sharply,
and after May 1920 prices began to topple in wholesale markets.
Dealers frantically tried to cancel the unfilled orders they had
recently written up, and the boom turned into a swift and
drastic contraction. The winter of 1920-21 brought widespread
unemployment, heavy cutting of wage rates, and an epidemic
of bankruptcies. Not until this unhappy episode had been played
through to its dismal finish did the country enter upon what we
now remember as 'the prosperous '20's.'
It is to be hoped that the recollection of what happened in
1919 will be kept fresh in our minds as we come close to the day
of victory. For basic conditions respecting demands for com-
modities, quickly available supplies, and consumers' purchasing
power promise to be a more extreme form of the conditions that
prevailed at the end of World War I. Unless we resist the tempta-
tion to grasp at paper profits from price speculation, we shall
repeat the costly errors we made then.
Our Program of Research in Finance and Conference on Re-
search in Fiscal Policy are both preparing reports relating to
the transition period. The first is dealing on the one hand with
the condition of the banks and the monetary circulation, on the
other hand with the financial condition and requirements of
business enterprises. The Fiscal Conference is studying public
debts and tax burdens, when and how they may be reduced.
These groups can serve effectively because they have investi-
gators and advisers experienced in handling similar problems,
can draw upon large collections of data begun for other ends,
and after the war will not be thwarted by inability to get the
personnel they need. It seems to the staff highly desirable that
these researches should be continued and extended in whatever
direction conditions require. The like applies to the studies the
Conference on Price Research is planning of price controls and
rationing during the transition period.
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Our assumption that,aftera relatively brief transition, eco-
nomic organization will resume basically its wonted form in the
United States implies that researches pertinent to the prewar
peace, and found useful also during the war, will continue tobe
pertinent in the postwar peace. In the opinion of the staff, the
unfinished business on our agenda is business that should be
transacted. We may expect, indeed, a wider appreciation of the
value of what we are doing because the puhlic will be more
aware of the nation's capacity for producing goods, morecritical
of any failures to realize the potentialities of our system, and
more concerned with the role played by government in eco-
nomic functioning. Also, the war will facilitate research of our
sort by extending, as World War I did, the range of quantitative
data at an investigator's disposal. This welcome development
has made notable progress even during hostilities. But while
the substantial continuity of economic organization will warrant
a corresponding continuity in our program, someshifts in do-
mestic conditions and some changes in the country's interna-
tional position can be foreseen that may call for modifications of
emphasis upon different lines of investigation, and perhaps ex-
cursions into new fields.
To begin with international conditions: The United States
will find that its position in the world economy has shifted
under stress of war, Itis a common, though not wholly ac-
curate, saying that ours was a debtor nation when World War I
began and a creditor nation when it ended. Our experience had
done little to fit us for grasping the opportunities or meeting
the responsibilities of a creditor position, and we did not adapt
ourselves effectively to this shift in our fortunes during the
twenty-one years of peace. Our great economicaccomplishments
had been occupying our homeland, exploiting its natural re-
sources, and raising our own standardof living. We had bor-
rowed foreign capital and welcomed immigrant labor, we had
exported products the world could not get so cheaply elsewhere,
we had imported raw materials andsuch fabricated goods as
we could not ourselves produce; butfor the most part we lived
on our own much as a frontier family lived,and as we grew, we
tried to become more instead of less self-sufficient. We gradu-
ally gave up our once great trade as an ocean carrier, repaid
the bulk of our foreign debts, and practiced protection of homeorders pouring into their offices. Frequently they could ship
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had been occupying our homeland, exploiting its natural re-
sources, and raising our own standardof living. We had bor-
rowed foreign capital and welcomed immigrant labor, we had
exported products the world could not get so cheaply elsewhere,
we had imported raw materials andsuch fabricated goods as
we could not ourselves produce; butfor the most part we lived
on our own much as a frontier family lived,and as we grew, we
tried to become more instead of less self-sufficient. We gradu-
ally gave up our once great trade as an ocean carrier, repaid
the bulk of our foreign debts, and practiced protection of homeindustry more vigorously. Aftei the first World War we re-
stricted immigration. When we began making large foreign
loans, the heavy losses we suffered showed our ineptness at this
type of business, and discouraged its continuation. We were
reluctant to accept payment of debts due us in goods we could
make at home. High as we had built our tariff wall when we
were struggling to develop large and diversified manufactures,
we built the wall higher still in 1930,afterour creditor position
had been firmly established.
We shall emerge from World War 11 more than ever the
world's creditor on financial account. Ours will be the only
great industrial system that has not been gravely damaged by
enemy action. And this system will not have been converted to
war uses to quite such a degree as has been necessary in other
belligerents. We shall have more ships and more airplanes than
any other country. Finally, our losses in manpower through
battle casualties, epidemics, and undernourishment promise to
be relatively smaller than those of the nations that have been
fighting longer, or have been occupied by enemies and subject
to their exactions. At least until the ravages of war have been
repaired, the United States will have no rival in economic power.
How our people shall exercise this power is one of themo-
mentous issues on which they must presently make up their
minds. While it is assumed here that they will join political and
military measures for maintaining future peace,it would be
risky to assume that the abandonment of quasi-isolationism in
world politics will be accompanied by the abandonment of quasi-
isolationism in world economics. We shall be in a unique
tion to help other nations; presumably we shall desire to doso,
and mainly on a business rather than a charitable basis. But
the ticklish question arises: How shall we let other nations
serve us in return? Presumably we shall extend credits for a
time; but in the long run we shall want payment of interest and
assurance that we can get back the principal of our loans. It is
doubtful that we will willingly add to ourenormous present
stock by accepting gold; in any case the quantity of gold other
countries could send us would be a minor fraction of their
debts to us. No large amounts of American securities remain
in foreign hands available for repatriation. Shallwe take title
to foreign properties running high in the billions of dollars—
property that cannot betransferred to these shores? Some coun-
tries produce raw materials ourindustrialists want or consumer
goods we cannot produce at home; but mostof the countries
with which our trade is large and whose wantswill be as great
are highlyindustrialized, and many of their products compete
with our own. Have we reached the stagewhere we are ready
to modify our traditionalpolicy of protection, and take payment
freely in goods of any kind our people areready to buy? is any
other form of payment available in adequatevolume? What
will be the consequences to our own interestsand to those of
other countries if we refuse to lower tariffsduties, and what will
be the consequences if we lower them?
Foreseeing this issue more than a year ago,C. Reinold Noycs
of our Board suggested that the NationalBureau consider a
factor in international relations that forlack of a better name he
called the 'export of technology'. This termis taken in a very
broad sense to include the employment ofAmerican business
organizers, engineers, and skilled craftsmen toimprove methods
of producing and distributing goods inother countries; the
leasing of patents, and the training offoreigners in our technical
schools, mines, factories, and oflices, as well asthe exporting of
industrial equipment. Many nations we think of as'backward'
will seek to increase their manhour productivity,and are likely
to turn to us asboth the best teachers and the best machine
builders. To render this service should be profitablein the short
run, and still more so inthe long run; for experience assures
us that we do mostbusiness per capita with nations of the
highest technological development.
Our efforts to outline this project inadequate detail, to find out
whether materials can be had for a satisfactoryinvestigation, and
to estimate how large afactor the export of technology may be-
come, have beenretarded by difficulty in finding someone with
the proper qualifications to make areconnaisance survey. For
this preliminary job the Executive Committeehas made an ap-
propriation and we now have grounds forhoping that the
scholar of our choice will take charge.
However much the export of technologymight profit the
United States and benefit the populations ofother countries, it
would not solve the problem of getting paidfor our exports. In
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while in the long run, as already said, highly indu:,trialized areas
will buy more rather than less from us. Certainly we should have
fuller and wider understanding of the effects of high tariffs under
the conditions we shall face.
This old controversy, in which economists have approached near-
est to unity of opinion and (except in Great Britain) have failed
most uniformly in getting that opinion followed, will assume
new aspects and perhaps the change in the times will cause many
men to switch sides. If our technological triumphs mean that
many American industries will be the world's cheapest producers
in their lines, then their managers, investors, and employees may
be eager to win foreign markets and willing to open the Amer-
ican market to foreigners in return for relaxing their restrictions
on imports. Export industries have in general supplied the minor-
ity that has protested against high tariffs and occasionally won
temporary reductions, if powerful interests that have been strong-
ly protectionist in sentiment now become avid for export markets
and change sides on the tariff, what has seemed an irreversible
policy may be altered substantially. There are observers who
think such a development possible.* But that raises another issue.
High productivity per manhour does not necessarily mean low
cost of production per unit of output. Apart from taxes, two
other factors must be considered—the cost of the industrial equip-
ment used and the price paid for labor.
American labor owes its high efficiency mainly to skill in using
the industrial equipment designed by engineers and paid for by
investors. On a cost-accounting basis, the expense of the equip-
ment becomes an interest charge upon capital invested, plus a
charge for depreciation, both figured per unit of ouput. The in-
'See, for example, Curtis P. Nettels, 'Economic Consequences of Wars; Costs of
Production', Journal of Economic History, Supplement, December 1943,pp.6-3.
Nettels does not think it probable that low-cost industries will win the United
States over to free trade, because American agriculture will find itself in the high-
cost ranks compared with formidable foreign competitors and demand protection
—thus reversing its earlier role.
vestment charge isbased on rates applicable to'venture capital'.
Some of our mostsuccessful industrialcorporations enjoy a
credit enabling them toborrow at very low ratesof interest; but
their managers willneither invest the corporations' ownfunds
nor borrow toinvest unless they see prospectof getting a return
that compensates forthe risks involved.When an enterprise in
less secure positionborrows, the lender reviewsits plans with a
critical eye upon itschances of success,and charges a corre-
sponding rate of interest.What will be theeffective interest
charges upon newcapital invested inindustrial equipment after
the war thus dependslargely, perhaps mainly, uponthe assess-
ment of risksby business executives,bankers, and the investing
public. Business men maybe confident of aprofitable demand
for their productsimmediately after the but doubtful about
its continuation duringwhatever long run iscovered by the pros-
pective life of theequipment in which theymight like to invest.
We cannot assumethat large sums willbe put into industrial
enterprises by men whodo not expect a higher returnthan the
standard interest ratesquoted currently in thefinancial press on
fully secured loans. Sayinghow high the effective rateswill be is
guessing at the degreeof confidence investorswill feel in the
success of theirplans for the future.Possibly these rates will be
lower than in the 1930'S,but we cannot be sure.
Among the factorsaffecting rates on. venturecapital is the risk
that equipment willbecome obsolete long beforeit is worn out.
While the rapid improvementsin technology ofwhich we hear
such gatifying reports maymake enterprisingindustrialists wish
to adopt thelatest methods, they willreflect that the faster the
rate oftechnological change the morerapid is obsolescence, and
therefore the highershould be their charge fordepreciation or
their provision forcontingencies. Mountingtechnological clii-
ciency imposes coststhat offset part of its gains.
In mosi industrialoperations, however, theannual payroll far
exceeds the annual interestcharges plus profits. It is oneof our
national boasts that wages inthe United States arethe highest
iii the world—notonly hourly rates butalso annual earnings.
And never have theseboasts rested on firmerevidence than at
present. Moreover,in the past Americanlabor has scored its
greatest gains duringthe process of readjustmentafter great wars.
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29The prices of labor have declined from their wartime peaks, but
less rapidly than the prices of commodities at retail. True, during
postwar depressions the slighter fall of wage rates has been more
than offset by widespread unemployment. But when business
picked up again, the slow subsidence of wage rates compared with
living costs has brought about a substantial rise in 'real wages'.
Whether this bit of economic history will repeat itself after
World War II remains to be seen. Workers will be reluctant to
see their rates cut, and the strength their unions have gained
during the war will presumably be used to resist reductions. Men
now doing work that will continue in peace will be best off.
Those engaged in work that ends with the war must change jobs,
if not employers or homes, and, as applicants for new openings,
will be in a weaker position. Presumably many may have to take
fresh jobs at rates considerably lower than they are now getting.
Also the period of transition will probably bring the disintegra-
tion of some unions and a general decline in membership. But
similar conditions prevailed at the end of World War I and their
probable recurrence after this war establishes no expectation that
wage rates will not lag behind living costs on the decline as they
did then.
In bargaining about wage rates, wage earners and employers
will confront as puzzling a combination of common and op-
posing interests in postwar as in prewar times. Both parties in an
industry will be concerned to expand its market, for output
and therefore employment depends on sales as truly as do profits.
The sales of any product depend in turn on keeping its unit price
so adjusted to the prices of other goods as to attract buyers. The
lower the selling price in relation to other prices, the larger the
sales as a rule; but prices must cover costs if profits and employ-
ment are to be assured. In most industries, labor charges are the
largest item of expense next to materials. So if it seeks to maxi-
mize the incomes of its whole membership, which not all unions
do, a union has to consider what effect the wage rates it demands
will have upon unit costs, unit selling prices, physical volume
of sales, and employment. Wage rates can be set so high that they
lower the incomes of workers either by raising prices and reduc-
ing sales or by heightening the employer's incentive to install
labor replacing machinery. Wage rates can likewise be set so low
that the members of a union, however fully employed, receive
30
smaller incomes than a moreaggressive policymight have brought.
To determine what ratesbetween the patently toolow and the
patently too high willbe most advantageous tolabor will tax
the shrewdest judgment.
The wage rates mostadvantageous to theemployer are no
easier to determine.Of course theemployer suffers from rates
so highthat they force anadvance of selling pricessufficient to
reduce sales drastically.On the other hand, verylow rates do not
suit an employerwho must get anadequate supply of competent
labor itt competitionwith other industrialists.Moreover, an em-
ployer's interest inexpanding sales leads him towish consumers
to haveabundant purchasing power;that is, to wish that pre-
vailing rates of wagesmultiplied by volume ofemployment be
kept on the highestpossible level—thoughthis wish may not
make him keen on payinghigh wage rates in his ownbusiness.
These variousconsiderations have to beapplied by unions and
employers alike to thediffering and evershifting conditions
under which theirseveral industries operate.Among the impor-
tant variables arethe relative magnitudesof labor and other costs,
the closeness of thelink between unit costsand selling prices,
the elasticity ofdemand, the pace oftechnological advance, the
situation with respect tocompetition within theindustry and
competition with otherindustries for the favorof buyers, the
limits upon marketexpansion set by costs oftransportation, and
the declining, stationary, orascending trend of thedemand for
the industry'sproducts. Many of these mattersare imperfectly
known, and each partyin collective bargainingabout wage rates
must guesswhat the other partyreally thinks concerning present
conditions and futureprospects. Nor issober analysiscom-
mon andconflicting interests everthe sole factor in wagebar-
gains. Frequently anger,obstinacy, personalambition have as
large a part in fixingdemands and swaying thefinal decision.
When a problem is socomplex as almost to defyanalysis, or
so becloudedby feeling thatreasoning is warped, theteachings
of experience merit even morethan their usualconsideration.
On this ground, we mayhope that the NationalBureau's large
collection of dataconcerning wage rates,employment, and earn-
ings will provewidely useful to bothtrade unions and employers
in the greatcontroversies that must beexpected. Wolman's
studies show moreclearly and more fully than anyothers known
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tto us the effects produced by different policies with respect to
rates upon employment and total and per capita earnings in in-
dustries facing a wide variety of conditions over considerable
periods. If the United States resumes its customary form of en-
terprise, this experience will be pertinent to the tangled problem
of postwar wage adjustments, on the solution of which the in-
comes of wage earners, the prosperity of business, and the future
of free enterprise depend. One of our most pressing duties in the
opinion of the staff is to round out these studies and make the
findings widely available as soon as possible.
Obviously, the level of wage rates established in the United
States after the return of peace will affect its position as a com-
petitor in foreign markets—which takes us back to the question
that brought up the wage issue. Wage rates high in proportion
to manhour productivity would tend to restrict our export trade,
and so in the long run make somewhat less embarrassihg the
quandary of how to accept payment. But in view of the urgent
desires of foreigners for American goods, and the absence of
other sources of supply, it is doubtful that Unit prices will be the
major determinant of exports during the first few years after
the war. In the short run, wage rates that mean high unit prices
of products may swell the dollar value of exports, and render the
payment puzzle more rather than less embarrassing.
This issue cannot be dodged and one of the most pressing
postwar needs will be to find a satisfactory solution. How that
can be accomplished, however, is far from clear. Certainly the
National Bureau has no special competence on the tariff; it has
iione of the foreign connections required for a thorough factual
investigation;it lacks funds for the field work that would be
necessary. On the other hand, we have full employment for all
our resources in hand and in prospect. Meanwhile the country
possesses in the Tariff Commission an agency with an experi-
enced staff and files containing a vast range of information. In
negotiating commercial treaties with many nations, the Depart-
ment of State has become intimately acquainted with the gamut
of problems relating to international trade in the form they as-
sumed between the two world wars. These are largely matters
that must be dealt with by diplomatic agencies. Not merely tariffs
designed to protect domestic industries, but also import quotas,
bounties on exports, exchange controls, cartels, and
other governmental devices to limit or divert trade must be con-
sidered in detail, and they can most effectively be dealt with as.
a unit. While the preponderant economic power ofthe United
States in the postwar world will give great weight to whatever
policies it favors, no nation can achieve a satisfactory solution by
itself. What procedures will be adopted, and what attitude major-
ity opinion in this country will take toward foreign trade we do
not know. Possibly we must reconcile ourselves to a continuation
of our old tariff coutrovcrsies, conducted by spcculative reason-
ings, ex parte statements of facts, and appeals to unenlightened
self-interest. If so, we must hope for the coming of a more intelli-
gent day, and meanwhile expect trouble.
Barring unfavorable occurrences we do not foresee, the active
domestic demand for goods, supplemented by a huge export de-
mand, promises to make our traditional form of economic organ-
ization function to the general satisfaction, once the period of
transition from war to peace is safely passed. This organization
runs most smoothly when demand for products is active; for,.
while it lasts, a large demand brings relatively fulL utilization of
labor, capital, organizing ability, and natural resources. That is.
why war, the most destructive of human activities to wealth as
well as life, produces a semblance of business prosperity, despite
the disorganization inevitable in the hurried shift from free enter-
prise to governmental planning. Postwar demands for goods are
not likely to match the insatiable demands of war; but they
should suffice to keep the American people fairly busyleast
until domestic consumers have satisfied their pent-up demand
for goods they cannot now buy, industry has reequipped its
plants, foreign nations are able again to produce most of what
they require, and unwillingness to receive payments in goods has
checked exports.
During these good times Americans will congratulate them-
selves upon the efficiency of an economic system that passed the
test of war with flying colors, reconverted itself to peaceful con-
ditions promptly, caught up war shortages at home, and helped
foreign countries to get back on their feet. This industrial accom-
plish.ment will show us at our best. The test that will be hard to
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Ibeen satisfiedand our business settles down to supplying the con-
tinuously recurring demands of a long stretch of peace. Can we
then maintain a high level of employment, year in, year out?
Experience answers 'no'. Our business record has been one of
alternating expansions and contractions. Only near the peak of
our most vigorous expansions have we approximated full em-
ployment, and no approximation in peacetimes has been so close
or lasted so long as the approximations achieved during major
wars. Unless we can learn to manage our affairs more skillfully
in the future, we must look forward to an indefinite series of
cyclical depressions, some relatively mild, some drastic.
To many this prospect may not seem exceedingly disturbing.
Despite the long hard times of the 1870's, the middle 1890's, and
the 1930'S, not to mention the more numerous brief setbacks,
some of which were very severe, we think of the United States as
having prospered wondrously on the whole. There can be no
question about our secular gains, attested as they are by a rise
in the standard of living so rapid that every generation has con-
gratulated itself upon surpassing its fathers in comfort, health,
and education. If we have gotten on so well heretofore despite
recurrent contractions, why should we fear their future recur-
rence? Granted that they bring heavy financial losses and hard-
ships to millions of families, may we not think of them as a
moderate price to pay for the progressiveness of free enterprise?
Even those disposed to answer 'yes' will admit that free enter-
prise could give no more impressive proof of continued progres-
siveness than to devise some way of preventing, or at least ameli-
orating, cyclical depressions without checking growth. If that is
not accomplished, there seem to be reasons for expecting that
public opinion will become more critical than ever before of our
traditional form of economic organization, and demand radical
changes.
Just at present Americans are restive under the restrictions
upon their freedom to choose their own occupations, and to buy
any goods they like at whatever prices they please to pay. True,
our people imposed these restrictions upon themselves by demo.
cratic procedure to gain an end they deemed worth the cost; buL
that fact does not prevent a feeling of irritation from spreading
even among folk who chide themselves for harboring it. The in-
numerable maladjustments incidental to the hurried govern-
mental planning and administering of a vast economy bring
criticisms of bureaucracy seldom tempered by recognition of its
achievements. The shortcomings of free enterprise,on which we
were dilating during the Great Depression, are temporarily for-
gotten. But if another severe depression occurs after a few years
of peacetime expansion, will not our tempers andour memories
shift once more? Will not millions of people then recall the full
employment and the high wages that prevailed undergovern-
mental supervision and argue that national planning brings better
results than free enterprise? An economic organization thatcan-
not use the most abundant resources in the world to make the
goods its people are eager to produce andto consume will come
in for heated condemnation and angry demands for drastic 're-
forms'. People will listen sympatheticallyto advocates of over-all
governmental planning in peace as wellas in war. Such advocates
we have with us now, and they will multiply in hard times.
A second factor will reenforce the first—the quite unexpected
efficiency of the Soviet economy. American Socialists have long
argued for a vigorous extension of governmental controlover
economic activities, but at best theywere presenting a bright
vision of what might be. After this war, critics of Americanin-
stitutions will stress the fact that the USSR after disastrous initial
defeats, and after some of its most highly industrialized districts
had been overrun by the Germans,was able to put into the field
an enormous and well equipped army that expelled the invaders.
They will admit the receipt of lend-lease aid from GreatBritain
and the United States, but they will claim, seemingly withjustice,
that the bulk of the supplies and equipment for both thearmed
forces and the civilian populationwere produced at home. If the
Boishevists hold to their modified form of communism afterthe
war, and if it approximates the efficiency it is demonstrating now,
critics will allege that Americans could maintain full employ-
ment of all their resources all the time if only they would stop
producing for private profit and reorganizeto produce for the
common welfare.
Thus one of the developments thatpeace seems likely to bring
the United States is a fierce controversyover the fundamental
character of economic organization. No doubt there will be sharp
differences of opinion about the precise roleto be assigned to
governmental planning even during the transition fromwar ED
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that fact does not prevent a feeling of irritation from spreading
even among folk who chide themselves for harboring it. The in-
numerable maladjustments incidental to the hurried govern-
mental planning and administering of a vast economy bring
criticisms of bureaucracy seldom tempered by recognition of its
achievements. The shortcomings of free enterprise,on which we
were dilating during the Great Depression, are temporarily for-
gotten. But if another severe depression occurs after a few years
of peacetime expansion, will not our tempers andour memories
shift once more? Will not millions of people then recall the full
employment and the high wages that prevailed undergovern-
mental supervision and argue that national planning brings better
results than free enterprise? An economic organization thatcan-
not use the most abundant resources in the world to make the
goods its people are eager to produce andto consume will come
in for heated condemnation and angry demands for drastic 're-
forms'. People will listen sympatheticallyto advocates of over-all
governmental planning in peace as wellas in war. Such advocates
we have with us now, and they will multiply in hard times.
A second factor will reenforce the first—the quite unexpected
efficiency of the Soviet economy. American Socialists have long
argued for a vigorous extension of governmental controlover
economic activities, but at best theywere presenting a bright
vision of what might be. After this war, critics of Americanin-
stitutions will stress the fact that the USSR after disastrous initial
defeats, and after some of its most highly industrialized districts
had been overrun by the Germans,was able to put into the field
an enormous and well equipped army that expelled the invaders.
They will admit the receipt of lend-lease aid from GreatBritain
and the United States, but they will claim, seemingly withjustice,
that the bulk of the supplies and equipment for both thearmed
forces and the civilian populationwere produced at home. If the
Boishevists hold to their modified form of communism afterthe
war, and if it approximates the efficiency it is demonstrating now,
critics will allege that Americans could maintain full employ-
ment of all their resources all the time if only they would stop
producing for private profit and reorganizeto produce for the
common welfare.
Thus one of the developments thatpeace seems likely to bring
the United States is a fierce controversyover the fundamental
character of economic organization. No doubt there will be sharp
differences of opinion about the precise roleto be assigned to
governmental planning even during the transition fromwar ED
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35peace; but they promise to concern details rather than funda-
mentals. The most fervent advocates of free enterprise may wish
to proceed cautiously in dropping some of the controls over prices
and foreign trade, while many advocates of governmental plan-
fling may present it as an adjunct necessary to preserve free enter-
prise. The all-out struggle will not come until we have reverted
to business as usual, practiced it buoyantly during several years
of active demand for goods, then succumbed to severe depression.
Some such prospect seems now to haunt the minds of many
men of affairs, and to animate their postwar planning for high-
level employment on the basis of free enterprise. So long as this
feeling of responsibility and caution prevails, and the demand
for goods continues large, a breakdown seems improbable. But
after prosperity has run its accustomed course for a while, will
not overconfidence spread as it has under similar conditions in
the past? The great smash in 1929cameafter 'the business cycle
had been ironed out' in the minds of the business public and
investors.
To say that a few years after peace is made the dominant eco-
nomic problem in this country will be to maintain employment
on a high level is equivalent to saying that the dominant problem
will be how to avoid major cyclical contractions in business activ-
ity. That, in turn, is the principal aim of business cycle research.
By finding the causes of recurrent alternations of expansion and
contraction, investigators have hoped to discover how contrac-
tions can be averted. The number and diversity of the diagnoses
and prescriptions offered, long a reproach to economics, stems
from the inability of investigators to determine how adequately
their own and one another's explanations account for what ac-
tually happens during a business cycle. Even the 'theories' most
fashionable today are really untested hypotheses. Yet some of their
advocates offer practical guidance to government and public with
an assurance that contrasts painfully with the caution of respon-
sible physicians in treating imperfectly understood disorders of the
body.
As its contribution toward scientific treatment of this problem,
the National Bureau has been trying to ascertain empirically the
round of occurrences that constitute a business cycle. That is an
undertaking far beyond the resources of an individual investi-
gator, for it involves analyzing the behavior of many economic
activities during as many business cycles as are covered by the
records. Both activities that do and do not conform regularly to
the general tides of expansion and contraction arc included; for
the problem concerns the functioning of the whole economy.
Several countries are covered, because business cycles have an
international sweep. Numerous cycles must be observed, for thus
can we best distinguish between cyclical movements proper and
the effects of the random factors that at all times influence busi-
ness. The job is so large and requires so much thinking about
both conceptual and technical issues that our business cycle unit
has spent some sixteen years upon it without coming in sight
of the finish. But we have reached a stage where it seems feasible
to attempt a provisional summary of the leading results. In view
of the crucial role employment promises to play in peace, the staff
believes the National Bureau can render no better service than to
complete this provisional summary as soon as possible, making
our findings available to economists who take the business cycle
problem seriously and to men who have to wrestle with it in
practice.
That after the war the country will follow changes in national
income and its distribution more anxiously than ever seems al-
most certain. The Conference on Research in Income and Wealth
will have reason to encourage discussion of the ever present and
ever changing conceptual and measurement problems in its field,
and to enlarge the area of common agreement. In particular, it
will wish to resume its efforts to get more trustworthy estimates
of the distribution of income by size among families and in-
dividuals.
Our assumption that after the war the American people will
resume their traditional business practices implies reliance upon
market mechanisms for determining the prices that guide produc-
tion and effect distribution. But this will not be a return to the
price status quo ante. We do not know how the general level of
commodity quotations will compare with prewar figures;we
can be sure that this 'level' as shown by comprehensive index
numbers will fluctuate continuously, and experience suggests that
for several years the fluctuations will be violent. Wecan be sure
also that the interrelations among different sectors of the price
system will have been altered by such factors as technological
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ization of wage earners and employers, and shifts in international
trade. To understand the economic happenings of postwar years,
we shall have to take account of these alterations in the structure
of the price system. Not only should the Conference on Price Re-
search complete its studies of rationing and price controls during
the transition from war to peace, it should also continue its long
run plans for exploring the methods of determining prices in
different branches of business, and the consequences to which
they lead.
Likewise the Program of Financial Research is dealing with
activities that will be maintained if free enterprise flourishes. Our
staff and their advisers believe that they should round out their
studies of (i)consumerinstalment credit, (2)investmentcredit,
businessfinancing, and warfinancing by entering the
fields of agriculturaland (6) mortgage credit. Presumably
there will be call also for certain studies in international credit
and finance; but just what extensions in this direction will be
proposed to the Executive Committee cannot yet be said. While
these fresh ventUres are being planned, the staff should push
further its analysis of the invaluable materials already collected
on the financial aspects of business and investments. The success-
ful execution of these plans would provide a well rounded view
of the nation's credit system and of the part financing plays in
both private and public activities.
There seems as little doubt that the undertakings of the Con-
ference on Research in Fiscal Policy should be continued and
perhaps expanded. The management of the huge federal debt
and the readjustment of federal taxes are matters that touch every
bondholder and every taxpayer directly and the whole popula-
tion indirectly. Study of these problems by an agency independent
of government, yet serving no private interest, should contribute
both critically and constructively toward wise action.
It augurs well that business executives are coming to appreciate
more clearly the interdependence of all economic activities. If an
enterprise is to prosper it must contribute toward as well as bene-
fit from the prosperity of others. This heightened appreciation of
common interests creates a climate of opinion favorable to the
collection and publication of economic data for the common
benefit on an increasing scale. But these data cannot tell their full
and true story without an interpreter. An agency equipped with
a trained staff and advisers experienced in many lines of business,
in a position to analyze current trends impartially, is likely to find
its aid welcomed more widely the more the common responsibil-
ity for maintaining employment is recognized.
It is not suggested that the National Bureau should confine it-
self to finishing the tasks already in hand. One extension ofour
program, mentioned casually above, impresses the staff as es-
pecially desirable—a search for the leading factors that determine
the rate of secular change in national output and in standards
of living. In recent years an influentialgroup of economists has
contended that the American economy has become 'mature' and
cannot continue to grow in the future as it has in the past. On
this premise, they have advocated far-reaching alterationsin
economic policy. Technological experts have vigorously denied
their premise, but the evidence for and against it hasnot been
subjected to searching examination. A thorough critique of these
opposing opinions is much to be desired. Stillmore useful would
be a constructive study of factors that tendto accelerate and fac-
tors that tend to retard economic growth from generation togen-
eration. Some of the tools we have forged and materialswe have
gathered would prove useful—notably Burns' analysis ofPro-
duction Trends in the United States, Jerome's Mechanizationin
industry, our estimates of national income since the i88o's,our
series of researches on production and productivity,some of the
measures of inter-cycle trend made by the business cycle unit,
what this unit is learning about the relations between short- and
long-term movements, and certain findings of the Programof
Financial Research. This equipment would haveto be assembled
and put in order for the new task. It should be augmented from
many other sources according to carefully thought-out plans. Nor
could the investigation be wisely confinedto the United States.
A comparison of rates of secular change in several countriespos-
sessing different types of resources and economic organization
would afford a better chance to formulate andto test hypotheses.
Envisaged in this broad way, the task looks formidable, andit
would be more likely to grow thanto shrink on our hands. No
commitment should be undertaken without careful consideration
of alternatives. But at present wesee no other venture that
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38 39promises to yield larger returns or that more directly ties into the
National Bureau's program.
No doubt the needs of the times as seen by the Directors and
staff will suggest other undertakings that merit careful considera.
tion. Successful research itself has a way of raising new questions Part Two
in the very process of answering old ones. In similar fashion, eco-
nomic practice is ever reaching out in new directions and reveal- A RECORD OF 1943
ing new gaps in our knowledge. Presumably more suggestions
and requests for research will come to the National Bureau than AND PLANS FOR 1944
wehave the intellectual or financial resources to undertake. Hard
as the choice may be we shall have to reject some attractive pro-
jects if we are to do our duty by others. For if there were no
material limits upon our program, indefinite expansion would
still be barred by our desire to maintain a high standard of work-
manship, and our rule that every report must be critically ex-
amined by a committee of Directors.
WESLEY C. MITCHELL
Directorof Research
40